reflections on the theory of language at the same time that he was producing one of the first detailed interpretations of HOlderlin's poems, or in his last works, he was reflecting critically on our entire tradition's constructions of history as he was also pursuing highly specific studies of Baudelaire and nineteenth-century Paris, Benjamin seems always to have had it both ways. But Benjamin's "two-way street" becomes our divided highway when we seem unable to cross easily from a theory of literature or cultural signification to the minutiae of a reading of literature or images-and when his quick exchanges between theory and reading. become, under our interpretations, less well-marked cloverleaves than grid-locked textual passages.
Our divided views and Benjamin, the problem of our bifurcated knowledge of his intertwined productions, appears also as a larger present problem in literary studies: the question of a theory of language and literature and their reading that always departs from and returns to the specifics, the "minute particulars" of textual reading, while pulling the latter toward a more global understanding.
A version of Benjamin's itinerary that sketched an uneasy move from philosophy to literature would be overly hasty and probably unilluminating for those who are not already familiar with his early work, for his years of technical study and training in philosophy are themselves marked by several shifts in terminology and aim. These shifts can perhaps best be approached by noting his changing attitude toward what we may call "theory of knowledge." In the rather specific senses in which Benjamin uses the terms Erkenntnistheorie and Erkenntniskritik-closer to epistemology and epistemological critique than to our current and often loose uses of "theory," as in the phrases "doing theory" or "literary theory"-one may note the stretching and expanding of terms that comes to characterize much of his work: he uses the terms, and criticizes and extends them in his usage. Much could be learned from a sustained study of his early involvement with and gradual reworking of the problem of "theories of knowledge": a few introductory and tentative remarks must suffice here.
In his philosophy dissertation on "The Concept of Kunsikritik in German Romanticism," Benjamin writes of a theory or concept (of Kunst or of Kunstkritik, in his example) being "founded upon epistemological assumptions" ("auf erkenntnistheoretischen Voraussetzungen fundiert").' At about the same time he could write to his friend Gerhard Scholem, in answer to the question of "how I can live with my particular attitude toward the Kantian system," that "I am constantly at work to make this life possible for myself through insight into epistemology."' In both remarks, one notes the foundational, grounding effort to establish the epistemological assumptions or conditions of possibility for a theory or a life directed toward theory. The A last provisional step may be taken in this selective outline of Benjamin's early philosophic writing. As is well known, the "Epistemo-critical Preface" to his book Origin of the German Trauerspiel rejects both "knowledge"(Erkenntnis)and the pairing of the term "concept" with that of "system," in favor of "representation" (Darstellung) and "idea." The rejection of "knowledge," as a merely acquisitive or possessive category, is anticipated in an earlier essay on language, a text to which I will turn briefly near the end of this paper; and the argument on behalf of "representation." and specifically the self-representation of truth in ideas, is a complex one that deserves its script-signs of their non-signification-is "invisible" ("unsichtbar") until the time of its significance has passed, and "prophetic" ("als Prophetie") only in retrospect, not toward a still-future future. This is bad fate (and also what Benjamin will come to criticize as a certain kind of historical reading and thinking). These signs seem never visible or "in place," except as remembered as once having been invisible, or returned, too late, to place ( "zurtickstellen"). What is thereby missed, Benjamin writes, is the chance to measure and conquer "the fates" ("Den Geschicken").
The collapsed instant of bringing-or not bringing-signs of the future into the grasp of a present is the moment of deciding fate: reading it "in advance," or only retrospectively; or rather not reading it, but knowing and using it, or only reading it. The messianic impulse to convert both the future that is coming and this present instant into a Nu of "fulfilled now" ("eritilltes Jetzt") would be an immediacy of time. and Weissagungi." The "happiness" of this present (day), which is also that of the immediately coming future-and is furthermore opposed to the "Ungltick" mentioned just above-depends on whether we know, have knowledge, to grasp the shirt immediately upon awakening into time; or conversely, whether we forget.
The curious twist to this textual conclusion is that putting on the shirt would be like exposing our naked body to fate. Putting on the shirt strangely forgets that the body is no longer naked, or it remembers what it is no longer. To put it another way, not to put on the shirt, to remain naked, would be to fail to grasp the tightly woven text of prophetic signs which, however, once put on, both covers the body's signs and is laid over them, as if a retrospective, but tardy gloss. Benjamin's claim for Proust's pursuit of happiness has led him, and his reader, to this crux of non-self-identical self -similarity, along a path on which both perhaps always already were. That is. the attempt to correlate Benjamin's disjunctive or disharmonious imagery of fate and character, reading and seeing or grasping, remembering and forgetting, may have been predicated upon the assumption that any one of these was self-identical, so that two or more might then be similar. But what emerges from the last sentence about Proust is that any one image may be not only non-self-identical, but of an untransparent, impenetrable similarity to or within itself, such that an immediate perception or surface-bodily access or grasp to its signs would always miss its grasp and displace. misplace, or forget. Benjamin gives one more elaboration to this thought. the well-known image of the stocking. and it is said to be not a "true practice" of a firm. courageous grasp, but the "truth-sign," the "Wahrzeichen" of a labile, childish turning-inside-and-out. The rolled-up stocking is both outside and inside, container and contained. "pocket" and "present" within: sign and knowledge. When a "grasp" then appears ("mit einem G riff ") to turn this two-in-one structure into a third thing ("dies beides . . . in etwas Drittes zu verwandeln"), into the stocking, this is not then the self-identical "real" stocking, but a likeness (specifically. an analogy) for Proust's image, which. Benjamin continues, is structured like the child's stocking in that a containing-but-unreal "dummy-ego" ("die Attrappe, das Ich") contains a "real life" of memories and forgetting and yet is neither one nor the other, but is always emptied so that the image can be brought about and in.
The relation of the child's stocking to Proust's image, or of Proust's image to the introduction of the more general "image" that appears at the bottom of the paragraph. is neither identity. nor even twofold similarity. Each relation has the threefold structure of sign (token, likeness), meaning. and the "untransparent" similarity between the two-an untransparency or visibility which this paper began by addressing as reading. and now turns into imagery. Just as an outside surface seems to assure a full interior in the child's stocking or in Proust's representation of character and remembering, and yet gets turned into a third thing-stocking or image-so did the surface-level. relations among images occur within the transformation ("verwandeln") of existence into "a preserve of memory" is, in Benjamin's terms, to say that the relations among images are the unfolding of the image as the structure and action of remembering: there, the stocking: here, the fan. The verbal images of "transforming," "emptying out," or "unfolding" "bring in" ("einbringen") one thing: the image in the discussion of Proust, knowing ("erkennen") the imagery of the fan of memory in this passage from Berliner Chronik. In terms of the explication at the beginning of this paper, the image of (a theory of) knowledge in the unfolding of a temporality from noting a sign of the future to, retrospectively, seeing the knowledge as an anterior one, is neither just a claim for immediacy. nor just the display of this first claim under or through the texture of a structure of reading, but also "a third thing" (" reading presence or immediacy of knowledge, still less reading the Messiah, but reading the absence of reading. This vanishing-point, the forgetting of reading and of being read, is of course readable throughout secondary literature on Benjamin, and even in some of Benjamin's own work, as he pushes limit of his imagery. But in the strictest instance, and the most difficult to read in its effacement of reading, the injunction is to read Benjamin's image of his character in the sketch "Der destruktive Charakter." He writes that the "destructive character is a signal" (GS, IV. I 'vol. 101, 397), hence a sign to be read. Its meaning, he continues, is that "the destructive character erases even the traces of destruction Iverwischt sogar die Spuren der Zerstorungl" (GS, IV. I , 397). How does one read from the sign to the meaning of the sign as its own erasure? This would yield "character" -the title word of the piece, after all-as if an immediacy of knowledge in noting the absence of reading (for the sign "means" that it is erased). But it also yields the trace-the nonpresent, now you see it, now you don't instant-of an erasure even in the erasure of all traces. This is the "untransparent" or the noninvisible, still-readable relation, the "undurchschaubar" similarity between noting images of knowing and remembering character and immediacy, and reading the image of forgetting fate and its reading. 
